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In an age of delicate maneuvering among the great powers, coast guards have taken new and leading roles on the world stage. When Washington wanted to demonstrate 
conviction and bring supplies to beleaguered Georgia without escalating already sim-
mering tensions around the Black Sea, the USCGC Dallas, a large U.S. Coast Guard 
cutter, was quickly dispatched.1 The trend has long been visible in Asia. Tokyo’s most 
extensive use of deadly force in the postwar era was an action by the Japanese coast 
guard against a North Korean surveillance vessel.2 More recently, a Japan Coast Guard 
cutter sank a Taiwanese fishing vessel in a collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai 
Islands in the East China Sea, prompting a relatively serious diplomatic incident.3 These 
most powerful coast guards are spawning imitators. India, for example, announced a 
bold new purchase of long-range patrol aircraft for its coast guard in the fall of 2008.4 
South Korea’s improving coast guard, meanwhile, has invited foreign reporters to a tour 
in the vicinity of islands that are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan,  
accompanying the visit with belligerent rhetoric.5
In light of this background, but also of the wide consensus that the rise of China is one 
of the most important phenomena for international security in the twenty-first century, 
it is especially curious that almost nothing is known about the organization, capabilities, 
service culture, or prospects of China’s coast guard. While the Japan Coast Guard has 
appropriately drawn the recent attention of scholars in the field, China’s developments 
in this regard have been neglected, despite the availability of ample source material in 
Chinese.6 Notably, a leading expert on China’s “frontier defense” recently observed that 
his own work “examines only China’s approach to securing its land borders. . . . Future 
research should study China’s approach to maritime defense.”7 Of course, there has been 
considerable scholarly attention to Chinese naval development, and this is wholly ap-
propriate.8 Nevertheless, studies of Chinese naval development tend to focus on offshore 
and high-intensity combat scenarios, including submarine operations and amphibious 
exercises, as well as the potential future possibilities for extended sea-lane defense, power 
projection, and nuclear deterrence. A widely noted incident in March 2009 involving 
U.S. surveillance vessels and Chinese maritime enforcement vessels (alongside Chinese 
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fishing boats) has also increased the salience of understanding China’s nonmilitary 
maritime-enforcement capabilities. 
In general, coastal-defense issues and, especially, questions related to so-called nontra-
ditional security have not been adequately explored in the Chinese maritime context. If 
Chinese perceptions with respect to coastal management and monitoring, port security, 
piracy, narco-trafficking, environmental protection, and search and rescue continue to 
be poorly understood outside of China, cooperation among the maritime powers of East 
Asia may well remain underdeveloped as well.9 The unprecedented December 2008 de-
ployment of the Chinese navy to join other navies in the Gulf of Aden in counterpiracy 
operations is unquestionably a major step in the right direction. But much more can 
and should be done to find common ground with China in countering nontraditional 
threats.
Today, China remains relatively weak in the crucially important middle domain of 
maritime power, that between commercial prowess and hard military power, which is 
concerned with maritime governance—enforcing a nation’s own laws and ensuring 
“good order” off its coasts.10 Despite major improvements over the last decade, China’s 
maritime enforcement authorities remain balkanized and relatively weak—described in 
a derogatory fashion by many Chinese experts as so many “dragons stirring up the sea.”11 
In Northeast Asia, China’s weak maritime enforcement capacities are the exception, 
especially when compared to the coast guard capacities of Japan (or, outside the region, 
of the United States). Indeed, Japan’s coast guard was recently described as almost, if not 
quite, a second navy for Tokyo.12 
China’s relative weakness in this area is a mystery, one that forms the central research 
question of the present study. This condition of relative weakness is outlined in the 
paper’s first part. The second part describes and analyzes the current situation of each 
of the five most important bureaucratic agencies responsible for maritime enforcement 
and governance in China today. The third part of this paper raises the question of what 
relationships these entities, and any future unified Chinese coast guard, would have with 
the Chinese navy. Before turning to implications and prospects, the fourth delves into a 
variety of macroexplanations for the weakness of China’s coast guard entities today. Part 
five analyzes the possibilities for future maritime security cooperation, by looking closely 
at U.S.-China civil maritime engagement between coast guard entities over the last 
decade. The final part elaborates on three possible strategic implications of enhanced 
Chinese coast guard capabilities. This study, as a whole, draws on hundreds of Chinese-
language sources, interviews in China, and, especially, a highly detailed and remarkably 
candid 2007 survey by Professor He Zhonglong and three other faculty members at the 
Border Guards Maritime Police Academy in Ningbo.13
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The continuing evolution of Chinese coast guard entities into more coherent and effec-
tive agents of maritime governance presents both a challenge and an opportunity for 
security and stability in East Asia. Enlarged capacities will naturally result in more strin-
gent enforcement of China’s maritime claims vis-à-vis its many neighbors.14 However, 
a more benign potential result is that enhanced Chinese capacities in maritime gover-
nance may result in greater willingness by Beijing to support global maritime safety and 
security norms as a full-fledged and vital “maritime stakeholder.” 
Relative Weakness in a Strong Neighborhood
The weaknesses in China’s coast guard capacities are amply evident to Chinese mari-
time analysts. They view these capacities as disproportionately small, given the scale of 
China’s maritime development. He Zhonglong and his colleagues write: “Our current 
maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with our status and image as 
a great power.”15 He and his coauthors elaborate: “Currently, among maritime enforce-
ment ships, the vast majority consists of small patrol boats of less than 500 tons, and the 
number of ship-borne helicopters is such that these forces cannot meet the requirements 
of comprehensive maritime law enforcement.”16 The Ningbo Maritime Police Academy 
faculty assert that the present situation is intolerable: “China is a country with a large 
population, and its land-based resources are insufficient. The oceans can replace and 
supplement for land space and with respect to resources have enormous latent capacity 
and strategic significance.”17
By contrast, other Pacific powers, and especially the United States and Japan, wield 
tremendously strong and effective coast guards. This unfavorable comparison is well 
documented and understood among Chinese maritime analysts.18 Indeed, the level of 
detailed understanding in China of American and Japanese coast guard capacities is 
impressive, suggestive simultaneously of envy and admiration.19 Illustrating the rela-
tive weakness of Chinese coast guard capacity, He Zhonglong, for instance, notes that 
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is equipped with 250 aircraft of different types, while the 
Japanese coast guard has seventy-five. Chinese coast guard entities, with much less devel-
oped aviation forces, probably field fewer than three dozen aircraft of all types.20 Aircraft 
are crucial for both long-range patrol, on the one hand, and complicated rescues, on the 
other. Moreover, the professional requirements for a nation’s coast guard to maintain a 
strong aviation component are considerable. Therefore, these numbers are reflective of 
the very large gap that separates China from these other major Pacific coast guard forces, 
a fact duly noted by the Ningbo Academy study.21 Table 1 illustrates that although coast 
guard entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have relatively many small and 
very small patrol vessels (under 1,500 tons), Beijing is well behind both Washington 
and Tokyo in numbers of medium-sized (1,500–3,000 tons) and large (over 3,500 tons) 
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cutters.22 The Ningbo Academy study additionally points out that the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) undertook in 1996 a successful unification of disparate maritime enforcement 
elements into a single, powerful Korea Coast Guard, modeled on the American and 
Japanese paradigms.23 
Beijing’s impulse to upgrade its coast guard capabilities is clearly related to its overall 
strategic goal of increasing its maritime capabilities more generally and is thus quite 
consistent with China’s rapid naval development. Indeed, the implications of this initia-
tive for East Asian security are considerable and will be analyzed at the conclusion of 
this study. The tone of the Ningbo Academy analysis certainly does suggest the signifi-
cance of the national security factor in Chinese thinking about maritime enforcement 
capabilities. Its authors observe, for example, that “today, cold war thinking still exists 
in many countries. . . . [T]here are hostile attitudes.”24 Regarding the delicate issue of 
sovereignty in the South China Sea, the same analysis notes: “On the one hand, China 
and the ten states of ASEAN signed the code of conduct with respect to the South Sea 
in Phnom Penh, [but] to some degree, what has happened is that China’s sovereignty 
and interests continue to be seriously encroached upon.”25 This motive is not surprising 
and is consistent with strong nationalism extant among Chinese intellectuals and policy 
analysts more generally. 
However, another strong current is evident in China’s buildup of coast guard capacities, 
one that is quite cognizant of globalization and the growing interdependence among 
nations. In this current of thinking, also amply evident in the Ningbo Academy analysis, 
can be found the quite sophisticated and encouraging notion that strong coast guards 
might, by their versatile nature, actually serve as cushions between navies, helping to 
mitigate the possibility of interstate conflict in East Asia. Along these lines, it is reas-
suring that He Zhonglong and his coauthors conclude, “Everyone lives together on one 
planet, and are confronted by common threats, and have common interests.”26 Another 
Table 1. Pacific Coast Guards Compared 
Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, pp. 142–43.
Length of coastline (km)           160,550
Large cutters  8 5 11 12
(3,500 tons+)
Midsize cutters 19 9 37 32
(1,500 tons+)
Small cutters 149 66 82 44
(500 tons+)
Small boats 304 111 107 258
(100 tons+)
Country China South Korea Japan USA
18,000 11,542 30,000
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analysis likewise notes that international relationships built with other coast guards have 
“many time[s] succeeded in foiling transnational criminal activity.”27 The study by the 
Ningbo Academy faculty ultimately pinpoints the organizational factor in explaining 
weakness in Chinese maritime enforcement capacity. As its coauthors write, 
The organizational set up of China’s maritime governance is not ideal. For a long time, 
there has been the situation of “a group of dragons stirring up the sea”: in every situation 
there are multiple agencies involved, each with their own competence and scope of juris-
diction overlapping, as well as glaring gaps. Internally, this creates problems with respect 
to consistent enforcement, while externally there is no unity of effort. The result is a situa-
tion of a passive, weak, and ineffective force.28
While this explanation in itself is quite persuasive, this analysis will evaluate some other 
potential causes of this weakness as well, in addition to evaluating prospects for reform, 
the potential for developing further international cooperation in maritime security, and 
the attendant strategic implications for East Asian security.
China’s Five Maritime Enforcement Dragons
Altogether, China’s “five dragons stirring up the sea”—that is, the five agencies that 
constitute the nation’s maritime enforcement capabilities—amount to roughly forty 
thousand personnel, according to the analysis by Ningbo Academy.29 
The following section briefly describes the organization, missions, and capabilities of 
each of the “dragons.” However, it should be noted that while the Maritime Safety Ad-
ministration (MSA) is remarkably transparent, the other, smaller organizations are less 
accessible and therefore less well understood.
The Maritime Police of the Border Control Department (BCD)
The China Maritime Police (公安边防海警部门) is a part of the Border Control 
Department, which is an elite subcomponent of the People’s Armed Police, under the 
Table 2. Planning Requirement for Chinese Maritime Enforcement Vessels  
Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 142.
Large cutters — 4 — — 4 8
(3,500 tons+)
Midsize cutters 2 6 5 1 5 19
(1,500 tons+)
Small cutters 20 30 30 26 43 149
(500 tons+)
Small boats 26 95            80 304
(100 tons+)
Tonkin 
Gulf
East China 
Sea
Yellow 
Sea
Bohai 
Gulf
South China 
Sea
Total
103
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Ministry of Public Security. This pattern is likely derived from the Soviet model, which 
also designated border guards as a separate and elite formation. The China Maritime 
Police operate speedboats and small cutters generally. These craft are often armed with 
machine guns or small cannons. It is worth emphasizing that this force is armed, because 
several of the other important dragons are unarmed, raising a host of complications. 
A current workhorse of the Maritime Police fleet is the Seal (海豹) HP1500-2, a high-
speed patrol craft. These small vessels are capable of fifty-two knots, have a range of 250 
km, and require a crew of six to eight personnel. Their intended missions include escort, 
on-the-water marine inspections, and search and rescue. The new standard small cutter 
for the Maritime Police is the Type 218. This design is forty-one meters in length; has 
a beam of 6.2 meters; displaces 130 tons; develops a top speed of twenty-nine knots; 
carries a crew of twenty-three; and mounts a single, 14.5 mm machine gun. A large Type 
718 patrol cutter for the Maritime Police was apparently launched in 2006. It displaces 
1,500 tons, and has a length of one hundred meters, a helicopter landing platform, and a 
37 mm cannon. The Maritime Police also recently took possession of two older People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Jianghu frigates, after they had been overhauled and 
renamed Haijing (海警)1002 and Haijing (海警)1003. At this time, the Maritime Police 
has no aviation assets.30
Photo 1. This 1,000-ton Type 718 cutter, Haijing 1001, serves with the China Coast Guard of 
the Ministry of Public Security. This ship, launched in 2006, has a single 37 mm deck gun. This 
is the China Coast Guard’s most modern vessel. (China Defense Forum)
five dragons stirring up the sea 7
The main training academy for the maritime police is in Ningbo. However, not all the 
students at the Ningbo Academy are maritime police; its students receive a generalized 
border-guard curriculum in their first years and apparently can opt into the maritime 
specialty about halfway through the program. Training facilities at the Ningbo Acad-
emy are impressive, especially the engineering and shiphandling simulators, which use 
advanced software to create a 
high degree of fidelity compa-
rable to simulators in use in the 
West.
The primary mission of the 
Maritime Police is crime 
fighting, but emergent threats 
of special concern include 
terrorism and piracy. Although 
no cases of maritime terror-
ism have been reported in or 
against China, fears have been 
heightened by the 9/11 attacks 
against the United States, continued unrest among certain minority populations in 
China that have resorted to terrorist tactics, and a naturally heightened consciousness 
resulting from the Olympic Games in Beijing. During the games the Maritime Police ap-
parently sortied thirty ships each day and stopped or detained over a thousand vessels.31 
Photo 2. Haijing 1002 is one of two new China Coast Guard cutters that were transferred to 
the Public Security Ministry from the PLA Navy. They were formerly Jianghu-class missile 
frigates. China Maritime Surveillance is another civil maritime agency that has received ships 
from the PLA Navy. (China Defense Forum)
Photo 3. A small patrol boat in service with the China 
Coast Guard. Chinese civil maritime authorities have 
lacked for an adequate motor surfboat for rescue 
operations and have apparently considered purchases  
from abroad to fill this requirement. (China Defense Forum)
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On the theme of vulnerability along the coasts, He Zhonglong and his coauthors write, 
“Our country’s cities of Hong Kong, Macau, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and such important 
cities along the coast . . . could become the major targets of surprise attack by interna-
tional terrorists.”32 Another China naval affairs analyst observes with similar concern 
that “armed groups from the Middle East are becoming more and more interested in 
maritime, surprise terrorist attacks.”33 Indeed, Chinese military and naval analysts have 
been keen to learn any lessons that have emerged from the November 2008 terrorist at-
tacks against Mumbai, which involved insertions by boat.
China’s maritime history is replete with difficulties arising from piracy, so it is perhaps 
not surprising to see great interest in the subject as reflected in Chinese maritime 
publications.34
Moreover, it is certainly noteworthy that the impetus for the December 2008 coun-
terpiracy deployment of a Chinese naval task force to the Gulf of Aden seems to have 
originated in part within China’s civil maritime sector.35 Indeed, piracy has long been a 
major concern among Chinese maritime analysts. One article on the issue emphasizes 
the proximity of the problem: “Of the 124 incidents of piracy in 2005, 60% occurred in 
Photo 4. Ministry of Public Security forces on a China Coast Guard cutter participate in a drill. 
Most of China’s other civil maritime agencies are unarmed. This has caused some consternation, 
for example, when Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels are lacking deterrence or 
enforcement capabilities. (China Defense Forum)
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Asia’s South Sea triangle [in approximately the area of the South China Sea].”36 Another 
Chinese analysis of the piracy issue concludes, “The pirates have lots of modern weap-
ons, are equipped with advanced communications equipment, and have secret links with 
international criminal gangs and even terrorist organizations.”37 Yet another source ob-
serves that Chinese vessels in distant waters have also been victimized by pirates.38 Thus, 
it would not be surprising to see various Chinese maritime enforcement elements active 
in future operations against pirates, perhaps acting in tandem with the PLA Navy.
As the primary armed element among China’s maritime enforcement dragons, the 
BCD—frequently referred to as the “China Coast Guard”—might well be expected to 
take the lead in confronting such challenges. At present, according to the Ningbo Acad-
emy study, the BCD has ten thousand personnel—about a quarter of the total of the five 
dragons.39 It is also noteworthy that the BCD has been designated as the “lead dragon” in 
liaison and exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard—a relationship discussed at length in 
the fifth part of this study.
The Maritime Safety Administration 
The only dragon that competes in power and prestige with the BCD is the Maritime 
Safety Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Transportation (交通部下属的海
事局及救打捞局). In terms of manpower, the MSA has twice as many personnel as 
the BCD—about twenty thousand—approximately half of the aggregate of the five 
maritime enforcement agencies. MSA missions include inspection and registration of 
Chinese and foreign vessels in Chinese ports, investigation of maritime accidents, the 
training and certifying of seafarers, supervision of marine traffic control, maintenance 
of aids to navigation, implementation of domestic and international maritime laws, 
and maritime search and rescue. There are fourteen regional MSA offices, mainly in 
the coastal provinces but also at some inland river transport centers, such as along the 
Yangtze River. Each MSA regional office has a rescue coordination center, and several in 
coastal provinces have a variety of rescue subcenters.40
The author was fortunate enough to visit the Shanghai Rescue Coordination Center 
(RCC) in November 2007. As befits one of the world’s busiest ports, the Shanghai RCC is 
equipped with modern and fairly well integrated ship-management systems. The Shang-
hai Port relies on at least eleven major radar stations and two vessel tracking centers in 
addition to the RCC.41 These systems are supplemented by the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS), which, per regulations of the International Maritime Organization, re-
quires vessels of over three hundred tons to report automatically their positions, courses, 
and speeds in real time.42 Such systems have revolutionized ship traffic control and dra-
matically enhanced maritime domain awareness on all the world’s oceans but especially 
along the Chinese coast; a major push has been made to set up AIS receiver/tracking 
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stations along the entire length of that busy shipping route.43 A further vessel track-
ing method employed by Chinese authorities is the China Ship Reporting (CHISREP) 
system. It requires Chinese-flag vessels to report their positions regularly to a coordina-
tion center. Somewhat analogous to the U.S. Coast Guard’s Amver (Automated Mutual-
Assistance Vessel Rescue) system, which serves as a clearinghouse for merchant vessel 
positions on a global scale, CHISREP has most obvious significance in the domain of 
search and rescue, though other applications—for example, pollution control—are quite 
conceivable. Another important technology on display at the Shanghai RCC during the 
author’s visit was extensive closed-circuit-TV coverage of the port area of the Huangpu 
River, no doubt improving port management, safety, and security. 
Despite this wide variety of mutually reinforcing systems, however, some problems 
seemed evident, especially in the realm of coordination. For example, Shanghai RCC 
personnel conceded that while their display screens could easily plot the positions of 
local MSA assets, they could not readily display those of BCD/China Coast Guard vessels 
in the same area.
 The MSA’s important position among China’s maritime enforcement dragons is con-
firmed by evident investments in capital stock—new ships and aircraft. (It is worth em-
phasizing here that MSA cutters are unarmed—a clear distinction from the USCG and 
other coast guards around the world.) The launching of the fairly large cutter Haixun 31 
(three thousand tons) in 2004 seems to have heralded a turn toward oceangoing rescue 
vessels. Though the ship reportedly had problems, particularly with communications 
equipment, it was noteworthy not only for its size but also as the first MSA vessel to 
carry an embarked helicopter.44 A June 2008 deployment of the vessel to patrol China’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea was covered widely in the Western 
press.45 Two successor ships are Haixun 21 and Haixun 11, the latter of which was com-
missioned in September 2009 and similarly displaces three thousand tons. It appears that 
Haixun 11 will be homeported at Weihai, in Shandong Province.46 
Three additional big, new cutters have been commissioned by the MSA, including 
Nanhaijiu 101, Nanhaijiu 112, and Beijhaijiu 111. These very large vessels—Nanhaijiu 
101 is listed at 6,257 tons, and all are equipped to carry helicopters—feature a dramatic 
departure in design from Haixun 31. With their very prominent forecastles and super-
structures and their extremely low aft decks, they resemble massive tugboats more than 
their actual equivalents in, for example, the Japanese coast guard. They appear to be 
equipped with very modern features, including, for example, variable-pitch propellers, 
which greatly enhance the maneuverability of large vessels. Current MSA doctrine keeps 
most ships at sea for two weeks, followed by just one day in port to resupply before 
resuming station. There are apparently two crews per vessel, each crew working two 
five dragons stirring up the sea 11
continuous months on board, then one month ashore. Crew members are thus at sea 
about eight months per year.47
With respect to smaller vessels, another innovative design is featured in the recently 
launched Beihaijiu 201. This small cutter is a high-speed catamaran, modeled on recent 
commercial ferry designs.48 The MSA has 
notably lacked small motor surfboats and 
may have recently purchased some from the 
United Kingdom.49 However, attention to 
smaller cutters is evident in the 2008 launch 
at Wuhan of a new forty-meter design, opti-
mized for Yangtze River rescue operations.50 
Progress in airborne rescue assets has been 
slower. Certainly, Chinese maritime analysts 
appreciate the crucial role of helicopters 
for contemporary coast guard duties.51 The 
coauthors of the Ningbo Academy study, for 
example, conclude, “A helicopter operating 
from a mother ship has enormous value 
. . . especially in conducting enforcement 
[operations] in blue water.”52 Nevertheless, 
airborne search and rescue capabilities are 
being built essentially from scratch. Though 
Photo 5. The large cutter Haixun 11 of the MSA was commissioned in September 2009 in 
Qingdao. In terms of resources and personnel, the MSA, which is part of the Transportation 
Ministry, appears to be the most influential among China’s civil maritime agencies. (China 
Defense Forum)
Photo 6. This catamaran, Donghai Jiu 201, 
serves with the Rescue and Salvage Bureau 
of the China Maritime Safety Administration. 
Catamarans are in wide use now as ferries 
and also with the PLA Navy. (China Defense 
Forum)
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a series of MSA flight bases were established in 2004, the service does not appear to 
currently operate many more than a dozen aircraft.53 Interestingly, the MSA already has 
a number of Sikorsky helicopters. Some helicopter rescues have reportedly occurred, 
but night operations are restricted. According to MSA personnel, the biggest bottleneck 
preventing a major expansion of the MSA flying service is training, of both pilots and 
rescue swimmers. In both these areas, China has made ambitious proposals involving 
assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard, but the USCG has been unable to respond so far. 
To date, PRC coast guard entities have benefited substantially from training assistance by 
Hong Kong’s capable airborne patrol and rescue service. According to an MSA plan an-
nounced in early 2003, the goal is to achieve effective search and rescue within fifty miles 
of the coast with a reaction time of 150 minutes; by 2020 this time is to be improved to 
less than ninety minutes. The range for search and rescue operations is also to be gradu-
ally expanded to cover China’s entire exclusive economic zone.54
China’s maritime rescue service has come a long way in a short time. In 1999, the MSA 
was faced with a Titanic-like tragedy when the ferry Dashun went down in bad weather 
just a few miles offshore in the Yellow Sea. Out of 304 passengers and crew, there were 
just twenty-two survivors.55 The accident, a major national tragedy, helped to galvanize 
efforts to establish a much more vigorous maritime rescue service. As Captain Bernard 
Photo 7. Search and rescue is a major mission of the MSA and aviation assets are now a 
development priority for MSA and Chinese civil maritime agencies more generally. However, 
deck aviation is still a relatively new concept for Chinese civil maritime authorities. (China 
Defense Forum)
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Moreland, USCG, as a liaison of-
ficer at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, 
wrote in 2007, “Less than 10 years 
after the Dashun tragedy, China 
has a fully operating professional 
maritime search and rescue capac-
ity.”56 Indeed, MSA can point to 
some concrete achievements, such 
as reductions over the course of a 
ten-year plan of maritime accidents 
by a third and maritime accident 
fatalities by a quarter. A new rescue 
network was established along the 
Yangtze River in 2001.57 During 
2002–2003, the MSA conducted 520 
rescue missions, involving 1,303 ship 
sorties and 25 aircraft sorties; of 14,901 persons in danger, 13,997 were saved, including 
787 foreign nationals.58
A key enabler of enhanced professionalism in China’s MSA is its high-quality profes-
sional journal, 中国海事 (China Maritime Affairs). Of particular note in this journal is 
the frequent and serious use of the case-study method: accidents are described, dissect-
ed, and mined for lessons that can inform future practice.59 Nor do these cases describe 
accidents only in Chinese waters; they examine related incidents around the world, 
such as the recent sinking of an Egyptian ferry in the Red Sea with great loss of life.60 
Additionally, a major emphasis in this journal is on learning from the experiences and 
procedures of maritime safety and security in other nations.61
Other common themes in China Maritime Affairs include recently promulgated laws, 
issues related to toxic spills, typhoon emergency response, newly available technolo-
gies, and profiles of service practice in foreign countries.62 Regarding typhoon response, 
China has received high marks in recent years for diligent preparedness and execution 
of emergency plans for dangerous coastal storms.63 The MSA has played a leading role 
in establishing Chinese readiness for the cleanup of oil spills. In September 2008 it was 
announced that China was signing an agreement on mutual support for oil-spill cleanup 
with Japan, Russia, and South Korea.64 This agreement followed a December 2007 inci-
dent in which the Hong Kong oil tanker Hebei Spirit was involved in a major spill off the 
Korean coastline; Beijing’s Ministry of Transportation dispatched two vessels to assist in 
the cleanup.65
Photo 8. A heliborne rescue undertaken by the 
Maritime Safety Administration. China began to use 
helicopters in civil maritime rescue operations in 
2006. (China Defense Forum)
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Unlike the BCD, the Maritime Safety Administration does not have a formal academy. 
The main maritime universities in Dalian, Shanghai, and Xiamen are apparently feeders 
for MSA recruiting. Compared to equivalent American schools, such as King’s Point and 
the Maine Maritime Academy, these Chinese maritime academic centers seem impressive.66
The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC)
As have fisheries all over the globe, the Chinese fishing industry has been plagued in 
the last decade by the environmental devastation wrought by overfishing. While growth 
in aquaculture has mitigated this crisis to some extent, fishermen all along the Chinese 
coast have experienced a difficult transition. As one Chinese study recently opined, “The 
fact is obvious that the development of our nation’s fishing industry has reached an ex-
tremely important juncture. Most—if not all—of the fisheries have been fully exploited, 
and many are already exhausted.”67 Another published study further reveals the scope of 
the problem. Since the 1960s, fish species in the Beibu Gulf area of the South China Sea 
have declined from 487 to 238. Stock density reached its lowest level in 1998, at just 16.7 
percent of that of 1962; fish stocks have recovered somewhat since.68
Photo 9. FLEC cutter 44183 on patrol. Compared to other maritime enforcement agencies the 
fisheries enforcement command has not received equivalent resources, at least to this point, and 
may also be significantly undermanned. The large poster on the ship reads, “Protect National 
Fisheries Resources.” As for many countries, fisheries conservation efforts have proved to be an 
extremely challenging task for the Chinese government. (China Defense Forum)
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Such conditions have increased pressure on fisheries enforcement institutions and per-
sonnel, because of the imperative to enforce new regulations strictly in order to replen-
ish fish stocks. A “zero growth” plan for the fishing fleet was initiated in 1999. By 2004, 
eight thousand fishing vessels had been scrapped, and there is an effort to bring China’s 
total fishing fleet down to 192,000 vessels by 2010. Summer moratoriums now exist for 
almost all of China’s coastal areas.69 The task is made even more complicated by the 
extensive overlapping of exclusive economic zones in the western Pacific, not to mention 
the wide-ranging migratory patterns of regional fish stocks. 
With a total haul of seventeen million tons in 2007, China’s fishing take is four times that 
of the nearest competitor.70 Official figures suggest that China currently has approxi-
mately eight million fishermen. Among finfish, Chinese are largely catching anchovy, 
Japanese scad, hairtail, and small yellow croaker; nets, line and hooks, and purse seines 
are used. The East China Sea accounts for the largest catch, followed by the South China 
Sea, then the Yellow Sea. Of these, only the South China Sea has seen increasing catches 
of late. China’s marine fisheries and related industries are ranked as the largest sector of 
the nation’s major marine industries. Guangdong and Shandong are the leading prov-
inces, as measured by fishing output; Fujian and Zhejiang are close behind.71
China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (农业部下属的渔政部门), part of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, apparently has just a thousand personnel.72 The strategic impli-
cations of the state of China’s fisheries enforcement capabilities were suggested in early 
Photo 10. A Chinese FLEC officer, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, seized a Chinese 
fishing vessel suspected of illegal large-scale high-seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific, on 
September 12, 2008. (USCG Official Photo)
16 china maritime studies
2009, when Chinese fishing or fisheries vessels were involved in a variety of international 
incidents with regional neighbors and the United States.73 Hints of ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency are revealed by the Ningbo Academy study, which cites fisheries enforcement 
as an example of confusion among the five dragons. There is, Professor He Zhonglong 
and his colleagues assert, 
the “got jurisdiction, but cannot find, or can find, but do not have jurisdiction” phenom-
enon. . . . The fisheries enforcement department has the function of escorting fishing 
vessels, but because they are unarmed, they lack enforcement deterrence and coercion 
capabilities, and thus have trouble dealing with situations that suddenly arise. . . .
The public security maritime police, though having the police function, and being 
equipped with all types of weaponry, possessing an advantage in any circumstances involv-
ing escort of fishing vessels, because of limitations on jurisdiction can only play a support-
ing role, and are in an awkward position. The country’s maritime rights and interests, as 
well as the national honor, are difficult to protect in such circumstances.74
Also important is that in addition to policies encouraging aquaculture, Beijing has in 
recent years pushed to develop a long-distance fishing fleet. By 2006, this fleet had grown 
to almost two thousand vessels and was operating on the high seas and in the EEZs of 
thirty-five countries.75 The Ningbo Academy study, for example, mentions this develop-
ment, asserting, “If our country seeks to resolve the food question internally, then it is 
necessary to exploit the sea’s bounty, through . . . developing the deep sea fishing indus-
try.”76 Chinese fishing vessels are now a common sight in the waters of Africa and Latin 
America, for example, a phenomenon that has brought about considerable controversy. 
From the Chinese perspective, there has been some question as to how Chinese fisher-
men can be protected—against, for example, pirate attack—in such distant locations.77 
This question in turn invites maritime analysts to consider whether Chinese maritime 
enforcement capabilities will expand to a global presence commensurate with the na-
tion’s global maritime commercial interests and how, if so, that would mesh with China’s 
emerging naval strategy, which has already embraced the counterpiracy mission. An 
even more sensitive question arises regarding fishing practice proximate to Chinese 
waters. As stocks have declined around the region, a sense of fisheries nationalism has 
grown. Indeed, a recent Chinese fisheries analysis concludes, “Although our country 
has signed one after another fishing agreements with neighboring states, the number of 
fishing industry security incidents involving foreigners has unceasingly increased. . . . 
Some [countries] even send warships to bump and sink our side’s fishing boats.”78 Ten-
sions flared in the summer of 2009 as Chinese maritime enforcement agencies patrolled 
against foreign violators of strict new fishing regulations in the sensitive South China Sea.79 
If, as has been suggested recently, a major buildup is under way of large, helicopter-capable 
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cutters for the South China Sea component of the FLEC, Beijing’s fishing policies in the 
region could well become more assertive.80
General Administration of Customs (GAC)
China’s status as an international trade juggernaut raises commensurately the prestige 
of the General Administration of Customs. Indeed, before the establishment of the PRC, 
China’s customs service (managed to a large extent by foreigners) virtually controlled 
the state’s foreign policy. The vast amount of international commerce taking place in 
China’s ports and on its coastal waters preordains the importance of the role of customs 
in maritime enforcement (海关总署下属的缉私部门). Among the chief missions of 
China customs are compilation of foreign trade statistics, revenue collection, customs 
control (declarations, etc.), countersmuggling, and port control.81 The latter two mis-
sions are most relevant to maritime enforcement capabilities. 
According to the China Customs 2007 annual report, the GAC represents “the compe-
tent antismuggling authority of the Chinese government, which takes up most, if not 
all, of the responsibility for combating smuggling.”82 The significant smuggling cases 
prosecuted by the GAC in 2007 were reported to number 1,190, involving more than 
US$1 billion, up 4.3 percent from the previous year. Among these cases were some 356 
major drug busts, which netted almost five hundred kilograms of assorted illegal drugs.83 
It is not clear what percentage of these interdiction activities occurred in the maritime 
sphere, but some preliminary evidence suggests that a portion of China’s drug trade 
does take place in seaborne vessels. Thus a 2007 article in the journal of the Fujian Police 
Senior Academy Journal suggested, “In the last few years, criminals with drugs passing 
through the port of Xiamen’s water transport routes have been using fishing vessels to 
smuggle drugs.”84 Similar concerns about maritime drug enforcement have been noted 
Photo 11. China’s Customs Agency operates a fleet of small cutters that focuses on maritime 
anti-smuggling operations. (China Defense Forum)
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in Chinese naval publications.85 The Ningbo Academy study also asserts the importance 
of the antidrug mission for the future development of China’s maritime enforcement 
capabilities.86 This is perhaps not surprising, as China customs has been working in 
coordination with the Ministry of Public Security to form “joint anti-smuggling forces” 
since 1998.87
China customs also plays a leading role in Chinese port management. The GAC is  
proud that “ocean going imports and exports can usually be released within 24 hours.”88 
China’s ambitious “E-port” initiative, outlined by the State Council in 2006, aims to 
smooth out port operations by harnessing information technology—for example, by 
allowing online payment of taxes and various charges. China customs holds the vice 
chairmanship of the National E-Port Steering Committee, which also has representatives 
from the other maritime enforcement dragons, including the BCD and the MSA. 
According to the Ningbo Academy study, GAC maritime enforcement personnel number 
about two thousand. Thus the GAC constitutes one of the smallest dragons, measured 
by manpower. Interestingly, a June article in a Chinese military newspaper suggested that 
the GAC has up to 212 fast patrol boats to employ against smugglers, but this figure has 
been difficult to verify.89 The 2007 annual report makes note of a recent salary reform, 
new uniforms, and the establishment of a new institute in Shanghai dedicated to cus-
toms issues.
The State Oceanographic Administration (SOA)
With an estimated six to eight thousand personnel, the State Oceanographic Admin-
istration—specifically, its China Maritime Surveillance (海洋局下属的中国海监), or 
CMS—constitutes a maritime enforcement dragon of medium size, between the large 
MSA and the much smaller customs and fisheries enforcement agencies.90 Major mis-
sions for the SOA include environmental protection, scientific research, and enforce-
ment of EEZ rights and interests.
The rising profile of environmental protection in China has increased attention on 
coastal environmental issues. The SOA has played an important role in recognizing the 
extent of current problems. In 2006, a major SOA study concluded that “China faces 
severe ocean pollution.”91 Some limited progress is already evident—for example, in 
efforts to set up a comprehensive coastal environmental monitoring system, an initia-
tive to increase compliance among coastal polluters, and a new network of 149 marine 
protected areas.92 The 2008 Beijing Olympics seem also to have spurred new interest in 
improving coastal water quality—in particular, in conjunction with the sailing events at 
Qingdao; SOA research centers were active in monitoring and forecasting water quality 
for that prestigious event.93 Along with curbing the runoff of pollutants discharged from 
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factories on land, another major concern is coping with spills of oil and other toxic sub-
stances, which are carried in Chinese waters in huge quantities.
Corresponding with its mission to patrol China’s EEZ, the SOA has a relatively extensive 
fleet of ships and aircraft. In 2006, it was reported that the SOA itself had twenty-one 
ships, each displacing between a thousand and four thousand tons.94 A recent report on 
the SOA’s South China Sea flotilla suggested that this division had eleven ships, six of 
which reportedly are over a thousand tons in displacement. This South China Sea divi-
sion of the SOA is said to be equipped with one helicopter and two fixed-wing aircraft.95 
A 2008 report said that the CMS had a total of nine aircraft and more than two hundred 
patrol vessels.96 Of late, the SOA has received at least three large new cutters, including 
Haijian 46, Haijian 51, and Haijian 83. According to a 2009 report, the latter is the SOA’s 
largest cutter, at ninety-eight meters; this 3,400-ton vessel, built at Jiangnan shipyard, is 
said to have cost about US$22 million and is assigned a helicopter.97
Though the MSA operates some aircraft for search and rescue purposes, the SOA’s al-
lotment of aircraft clearly separates it from the other large dragon, the BCD (i.e., the 
China Coast Guard), which has no aircraft. However, like the BCD, the SOA has recently 
taken over some retired Chinese navy vessels.98 Reportedly, Haijian 20 and Haijian 32, 
which will patrol in the Bohai Sea, are converted PLA Navy subchasers.99 With respect to 
the SOA’s mission of patrolling China’s EEZ, the Ningbo Academy study states bluntly 
that the agency falls short of requirements: “At this point, maritime enforcement patrol 
ships are only sufficient to patrol territorial and adjoining sea areas with any frequency, 
and cannot be responsible for missions within the EEZs or continental shelf areas.”100 
Photo 12. Haijian 83 is the largest and most advanced cutter of the CMS. The launch of several 
new cutters for the CMS over the last decade suggests that the CMS has a certain priority among 
China’s maritime enforcement agencies. (China Defense Forum)
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According to another 
report, the SOA was 
directed by China’s 
State Council to initi-
ate patrols of the East 
China Sea in 2006. 
This elevated surveil-
lance activity appar-
ently involved daily 
patrols by four aircraft 
and six ships, oper-
ated by the SOA.101 A 
2009 report suggests 
that the CMS initiated 
regular patrols of the southern part of the South China Sea in 2007.102 In aggregate, the 
CMS reported, in the period 2001–2007, fifteen thousand instances of illegal activities 
were detected in China’s EEZ, of which about ten thousand were apparently prosecuted. 
According to one 2006 report, the SOA is already closely collaborating with the China 
BCD in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Wan) area and is looking to do so elsewhere as well.103 
SOA sources candidly describe close coordination with the Chinese military.104 Indeed, 
during a public statement in October 2008, CMS deputy director Sun Shuxian declared 
that “the [CMS] force will be upgraded to a reserve unit under the navy, a move which 
will make it better armed during patrols. . . . [T]he current defensive strength of CMS is 
inadequate.”105 A similar message emerges from a September 2009 Chinese report that 
documented multiple interactions between the SOA and American surveillance vessels. 
Photo 13. A helicopter operated by China Maritime Surveillance. 
This is a type Z-9 design that is used widely among China’s armed 
forces. (China Defense Forum)
Photo 14. A Y-12 aircraft of the CMS. It seems China’s civil maritime agencies are generally 
lacking in sufficient numbers of fixed-wing aircraft, inhibiting long-range search and rescue 
operations, for example. That the CMS operates fixed-wing aircraft is again symbolic of the 
priority that the CMS enjoys among the civil maritime authorities. (China Defense Forum) 
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This report suggested that SOA vessels required better sensors and electronic warfare 
technology to cope with U.S. military surveillance craft.106
In addition, the SOA is leading China’s oceanographic research effort. According to the 
official SOA website, the agency has no fewer than sixteen discrete research centers and 
institutes. The agency is a major funder of research projects at China Ocean University 
in Qingdao and likely many other university centers as well. In 2005, a SOA research 
vessel capable of drilling cores from the sea bottom at depths in excess of three thousand 
meters circumnavigated the globe to advance China’s oceanographic research across the 
world’s oceans. The SOA has also launched a series of maritime observation satellites. 
China’s recent mission to Antarctica to establish its third base there was organized by the 
SOA, demonstrating the ambitious research agenda that the agency pursues.107
The Sixth and Mightiest Dragon? The Chinese Coast Guard and the  
Chinese Navy
Among coast guard–like entities, it is natural and proper to consider how roles and 
missions, not to mention resources, are allocated between coast guard forces, on the one 
hand, and navies, on the other. Sea-power theorist Geoffrey Till explains that although 
overlap is inevitable and logical, there is a spectrum of coast guard models, entailing 
different kinds of relationships with national navies. Till observes, “With the widening 
of the concept of security, accelerated perhaps by the events of 11 September, the extent 
Photo 15. A buoy tender of the MSA operates in close proximity to two PLA Navy vessels. 
Maintaining aids to navigation along China’s busy coasts is a major mission of the MSA. (China 
Defense Forum)
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of potential overlap is increasing in ways which raise issues over who should be respon-
sible for what.” As he further explains, some countries have navies and coast guards with 
dramatically separate tasks, while in other countries (often smaller or less developed 
ones) the navies themselves have functioned essentially as coast guards, active principally 
in coastal patrol, management, and search and rescue missions.108 
Chinese analysts have duly noted that some coast guards, including the USCG, have been 
critically involved in national security. One Chinese maritime analyst, for example, notes 
that Japan’s powerful coast guard serves as a vital reserve force for the Japanese navy.109 
As the authors of the Ningbo Academy study observe, “The United States explicitly calls 
its Coast Guard one of the five armed services, many times employing it for combat mis-
sions.”110 The same analysts are quite candid in projecting an important role for China’s 
coast guard entities in any future military conflict: “In wartime, under the command of 
the navy, [China’s coast guard elements] would escort maritime transport, would assist 
in controlling maritime transport and also with amphibious ships, execute antisub-
marine missions, protect ports, secure wharves, provide crews for some portion of the 
navy’s fleet and assist in completing national mobilization.”111 
An expert analyst from China’s National Defense University argued in June 2009 that 
large Chinese coast guard cutters could be easily converted for use in far-seas combat, 
while small- and medium-sized coast guard vessels could support coastal defense, 
undertaking such missions as laying defensive minefields.112 Captain Moreland like-
wise suggests, “Both China Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard are maritime armed 
forces that lie outside their countries’ respective defense departments or ministries, but 
are available to them for waging war.”113 It is, accordingly, perhaps not surprising to 
see elements of the Chinese maritime enforcement community taking a hard line on 
sovereignty and maritime claims issues: “Taiwan is in most respects still dominated by 
a few foreign powers. . . . [F]rom this perspective, Taiwan island forms the strategic core 
deciding the future fate of the Chinese nation. . . . On the sea, there are many neighbor-
ing countries that have island and ocean territorial disputes with China. These contra-
dictions are relatively extensive, and this has a major impact on room for maneuver in 
Chinese politics, foreign policy and military affairs.”114
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see China’s developing coast guard entities as 
simple adjuncts to the PLA Navy. A cosmopolitan outlook is strongly evident in the 
Ningbo Academy study: “The initiation of armed conflict[,] or even limited war, would 
severely impact the whole region and international system, and does not conform to the 
nation’s circumstances of development.”115 Moreover, the Ningbo Academy is part of 
the BCD, one of a few armed elements among China’s coast guard entities; one might 
logically presume the unarmed elements (e.g., the powerful MSA) to be less inclined to 
quasi-military activities. Also evident in the Ningbo Academy study is a sense that coast 
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guard entities may actually be in competition with the Chinese navy for resources. These 
scholars, for example, observe with evident frustration that “internally, many scholars 
believe that maritime power means maritime military power, and maritime military 
power means the navy.”116 
A crucial question arises as to what the disposition of the Chinese navy, and the PLA 
more generally, will be toward improving maritime enforcement capabilities. Pre-
liminary evidence, in the form of an article in the June 2008 issue of the official and 
prestigious 中国军事科学 (China Military Science), suggests that the PLA will support 
this endeavor; its author, from the Chinese National Defense University, emphatically 
calls for stronger maritime enforcement capabilities as a crucial component of a new 
Chinese maritime strategy.117 In July 2009, a significant search and rescue exercise was 
undertaken in the vicinity of the Pearl River Delta. The co-organizers were the PLAN’s 
South Sea Fleet and the Guangdong provincial government. Thirteen agencies, twenty-
five vessels, and two helicopters took part in the exercise, which was termed a “立体军
警民” (three-dimensional—that is, military, coast guard, and civilian) exercise. A Navy 
publication describing the exercise notes that China has set up a new and robust search 
and rescue system but laments that the military regions are not well integrated into that 
structure—a problem suggesting the need for further such exercises.118
Reconsidering Till’s two alternative models—wide bifurcation or extensive overlap—it 
is worth noting that China has clearly emerged from the latter tradition. For much of 
the Cold War, its navy was not much more than an elaborate coast guard. Today, more 
bifurcation is occurring as China’s navy emphasizes technology-intensive warfare. None-
theless, the PLA is also increasingly interested in issues that have often concerned coast 
guards, including search and rescue, environmental protection, and piracy, suggesting 
that a strict bifurcation of roles is simply not practical for China in the near or medium 
term.119
Photo 16. In July 2009, the first-ever major search and rescue exercise involving significant naval 
units and civil maritime entities (twenty-five vessels and thirteen agencies) reportedly took place 
in the Pearl River Delta of southern China. (Modern Navy)
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Explaining the Weakness of China’s Maritime Enforcement Capabilities
This study has given priority to offering an objective and detailed rendering of the 
current statuses of various Chinese coast guard entities, primarily because no such 
rendering yet exists in the English language. Still, it is important to lay a foundation for 
explaining the central phenomenon at issue: China’s relative weakness in coast guard 
capacities. Three related explanations are examined below: modernization processes, 
economic issues, and finally, institutional structural issues. No doubt these differ-
ent explanations have 
complex linkages; for 
example, economic and 
institutional structural 
issues are clearly results 
of modernization pro-
cesses. Still, there is value 
in focusing on different 
segments of the various 
causal links.
A recent and extremely 
helpful article by Richard 
Suttmeier titled “China, 
Safety, and the Manage-
ment of Risks” explains 
that conventional wisdom posits a strong relationship between modernity and safety. 
He writes, “The wealth and power expected from ‘modernization’ have long been seen 
in China—and elsewhere—as risk-reducing, safety-enhancing developments.”120 Wealth 
and education can bring about China’s “sixth modernization”—enabling Beijing “to 
manage environmental and technological risk.”121 Suttmeier’s analysis looks at the 
example of civil aviation in China, suggesting that “China’s performance on safety issues 
. . . attracted and maintained high-level political and managerial attention . . . which 
permitted the introduction of redundancy.”122 The essential argument here, then, is that 
China’s coast guard entities could not function effectively until China became a mod-
ern society; until then, it simply lacked the wherewithal. Besides, many other demands 
took precedence, not least economic and political survival—which, at certain points 
during the “Century of Humiliation” and the Cold War, could not be taken for granted. 
Having secured China from existential threats and moved it out of poverty, Beijing can 
now turn to such previously second-order priorities as effective maritime governance 
and even the relatively new concept of valuing individual lives. However, Suttmeier does 
ask the provocative question of whether the “sixth modernization” can proceed without 
Photo 17. China Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA accepted 
two Eurocopter EC225s into service in 2007. Further development 
of aviation forces by China’s civil maritime agencies appears to be 
a priority. (China Defense Forum)
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further political liberalization that would support “transparency in China’s risk manage-
ment strategies” by empowering “activist civil organizations that have autonomy and . . . 
resources.”123
An alternative explanation that prioritizes economic factors in particular may be more 
amenable to Beijing’s current mode of thinking. Suttmeier calls for a “science-based 
regulatory regime that is also sensitive to market forces.”124 He explains: “China needs 
multiple mechanisms of risk management and governance that address the incentives 
and disincentives operating on individual economic decision-makers.”125 According to 
this view, order in China’s coastal waters is simply a requirement of the rapidly devel-
oping coastal economy. Powerful corporate entities are demanding the orderly man-
agement of ports and the safe, reliable passage of ships (and of the goods they carry). 
Maritime disasters like the Dashun ferry tragedy in 1999 injured not only the victims 
and national pride but also business as well, and it reflected poorly on Chinese techni-
cal quality and organizational efficiency. The safety-and-security culture in China may 
flow from corporate entities outward. Suttmeier highlights the important contributions 
of increasingly sophisticated Chinese insurance markets;126 coast guard improvements 
may be seen as a new form of insurance for the massive investments made in China’s 
maritime trade.
A final explanation has been a recurrent theme of this paper and is the central theme of 
the important Ningbo Academy study of 2007—that the balkanization of maritime en-
forcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese 
coast guard entities.127 The dragons duplicate one another in certain functions, fail to 
Photo 18. Two small cutters from the MSA (foreground and right), are shown berthed across 
from a cutter from the FLEC. There is some coordination among Chinese civil maritime 
authorities, but it is also clear that Chinese maritime analysts perceive some problems in getting 
the disparate agencies involved to work in concert to serve China’s maritime interests. (China 
Defense Forum)
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coordinate effectively in others, and are individually too weak to achieve fundamental 
breakthroughs in maritime governance—for example, in long-range search and rescue. 
Suttmeier addresses this problem, noting that “responsibility for regulation is often 
fragmented with the result that no one agency in the central government has control. 
. . . Effective coordination among central government agencies, and between the central 
government and local governments, has long been recognized as a key problem of gov-
ernance in a rapidly changing China.”128 Indeed, a considerable problem within China’s 
coast guard entities (for example, the MSA) is that local entities are often more power-
ful than the center in terms of resources, a situation promoting further balkanization, 
inconsistency, and incoherence.129 
In sum, modernization and economic explanations give considerable reason for op-
timism. Nevertheless, coast guard modernization in China is likely to continue to be 
slowed by failures related to a lack, first, of entities in civil society charged with keeping 
Chinese maritime governance structures honest, and also, more important, of a perva-
sive disunity of effort.
A Case Study in Cooperative Maritime Security 
Notwithstanding that most coast guards have intricate and special relationships with 
the naval forces of their nations, they are uniquely positioned to spearhead a coop-
erative maritime security agenda. This is because coast guards confront a panoply 
of challenges of concern to all states with maritime interests. Indeed, many of those 
challenges cannot 
be met without 
robust international 
cooperation. In that 
light, it is instruc-
tive to consider the 
cooperation between 
the U.S. Coast 
Guard and Chinese 
coast guard entities 
that has blossomed 
over the last decade, 
while navy-to-
navy contacts have 
remained rather 
limited. 
Photo 19. Captain Bernard Moreland, former U.S. Coast Guard 
liaison officer posted to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, participates in a 
professional dialogue with members of the China Coast Guard during 
a visit to their academy in Ningbo. The designation of an O6 level 
billet by the U.S. Coast Guard to the Beijing embassy is a signal of 
Washington’s desire to enhance bilateral maritime cooperation. (USCG 
Official Photo)
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Search and rescue cooperation has been 
quite successful—an achievement that can 
be measured in lives saved. In 2007, the 
USCG’s Amver reporting system, which 
assists in rescue coordination across the 
globe by exchanging data on participat-
ing vessels near ships in distress, proved 
crucial to major rescues of Chinese sailors 
on two occasions. In March, Unicorn Ace, 
with a crew of nineteen Chinese citizens, 
sank in the South China Sea. The Hong 
Kong Rescue Service, querying the USCG 
Amver system, identified and vectored in 
a nearby freighter, which rescued eleven of 
the crew. Even more dramatically, in July 
the vessel Haitong 7, crewed by twenty-
two Chinese nationals and carrying lumber from New Guinea to Dalian, was caught 
in a typhoon three hundred miles northwest of Guam and sank; the survivors were 
Photo 20. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Charles 
D. Wurster, serving then as Pacific Area 
Commander, presents Director-General Chen 
Aiping of the China MSA with a commemorative 
plaque honoring the U.S. Coast Guard and China 
MSA on 4 April 2008 in Alameda, California. 
The USCG and China MSA have engaged in 
quite extensive exchanges and other forms of 
cooperation. (USCG Official Photo)
Photo 21. The crew from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell trains with the China 
Coast Guard in Shanghai during August 2007. Boutwell visited China as U.S. Coast Guard 
representatives for the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. This forum was developed to increase 
international maritime safety and security in the North Pacific and has evolved to become the 
most developed international organization focused on maritime security in the vital East Asian 
region. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
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scattered across a thousand miles of ocean. Again, merchant vessels alerted by the Amver 
system were crucial to the rescue, as were two U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft and two USCG 
cutters. American rescuers coordinated closely with Chinese rescue authorities, receiving 
from them information that aided the rescue plan. Thirteen of the Chinese sailors were 
eventually saved. Few aspects of maritime cooperation can be so powerfully symbolic for 
building vital trust and cooperation as mutual aid to sailors in distress.130
Another area of fruitful cooperation has been in the area of high-seas fisheries. In 
particular, the USCG and the Chinese FLEC have developed a major innovation to help 
enforce a United Nations General Assembly resolution prohibiting drift net fishing on 
the high seas. Their approach involves the temporary posting of FLEC officials aboard 
U.S. cutters patrolling the North Pacific. For example, a FLEC “ship rider” boarded 
the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719) in August 2007. In one notable case, a fishing boat 
suspected of using drift nets initially claimed Chinese registry and refused to submit to 
an inspection by a Boutwell boarding team. The FLEC ship rider, however, had both the 
jurisdiction and skills to inspect the vessel and detain the ship. The FLEC then sortied Yu 
Zheng 118 from Yantai on a long journey to rendezvous with Boutwell and take custody 
of the offending vessel and crew. This pattern was repeated six more times in 2007, dur-
ing which process “international enforcement cooperation resulted as the mechanisms 
finally fell into place for exchanging operational intelligence and plans.”131 One can quite 
easily imagine a wide spectrum of similar environmental initiatives that would benefit 
from creative U.S.-China cooperation, including many in the maritime dimension.
Photo 22. The 378-foot Coast Guard Cutter Rush, homeported in Honolulu, Hawaii, arrives 
in Shanghai on 1 November 2009. The crew of Rush was in China to engage in maritime 
partnerships and cultural exchanges. The U.S. Coast Guard has built significant goodwill 
with Chinese maritime agencies, potentially building the basis for a more extensive maritime 
partnership between the United States and China. (USCG Official Photo)
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Yet another vital area of maritime cooperation concerns port security and flag-state 
rights. China has been a leading player in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), an ef-
fort to ensure that the huge numbers of containers entering U.S. ports each year cannot 
be used to transport terrorists or, in the worst case, a weapon of mass destruction. Teams 
of USCG experts frequently visit Chinese ports to discuss requirements and exchange 
security practices. Reciprocal visits are made to American ports by delegations from 
the Chinese Ministry of Transportation. USCG personnel are also frequent visitors to 
Chinese shipyards, as they must certify repairs made on U.S.-flagged vessels. Similarly, 
the China Classification Society now maintains offices in the United States and visits 
American ports to inspect Chinese-flag vessels.132 Given the huge amount of U.S.-China 
shipborne commerce, it is perhaps not surprising that this form of maritime coopera-
tion is both broad and deep, entailing the regular posting of each country’s officials in 
the major ports of the other. It is well worth considering how this practical, grassroots 
cooperation might serve the larger cause of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.
While the progress in bilateral coast guard cooperation is impressive, there are never-
theless real constraints and challenges that inhibit further expansion of the relation-
ship. Most obviously, there are the coordination difficulties that result from the fact 
Photo 23. Chinese coast guard cadets drill aboard USCG cutter Eagle in the Atlantic during 
August 2009. Second Lieutenant Dun Mao, from Changsha in Hunan Province, of the Chinese 
Public Security Marine Police Academy, gets help from classmates to don a survival suit. The 
four Chinese cadets and one officer spent three weeks in America, training with different Coast 
Guard units. In 2010, cadets from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy are scheduled to go to China 
to train with its Public Security Marine Police Academy. (USCG Official Photo)
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that there there is no single counterpart for the USCG on the Chinese side but rather a 
group of often-competing institutions. An additional major problem concerns USCG 
resources, since the organization is not primarily tasked with conducting international 
engagement. Moreover, the small resources that the USCG does have for international 
activities tend to be absorbed by initiatives related to the global war on terror. A third 
complication is that the two nations have somewhat different priorities when it comes 
to maritime governance: Washington has prioritized the counterterrorism mission since 
the 9/11 attacks, but Beijing continues to give first place to sovereignty issues. Never-
theless, the USCG has led the way in developing U.S.-China maritime cooperation, 
by “look[ing] for areas where China wants what the United States wants. Negotiating 
how to execute a mutual interest takes far less resources than an adversarial negotia-
tion to find a middle ground.”133 Contrary to conventional wisdom, moreover, it is quite 
possible that cooperation between American and Chinese law-enforcement entities 
could actually increase Beijing’s respect for human-rights norms.134 One high-value 
program for the Chinese Maritime Police has arisen from the willingness of the USCG 
to allow Chinese trainees into its Cadet Summer Program. Chinese students are still not 
able to attend the full U.S. Coast Guard Academy course, but such exchanges should 
be expanded further and reciprocated with American students in Chinese maritime 
enforcement institutions. Faculty exchanges could also help in this important area of 
bilateral cooperation. Given the clear priority of international cooperation in the new 
U.S. maritime strategy, the leadership of the U.S. Navy would do well to study the recent 
USCG experience with China to see how enhanced cooperation could serve the larger 
cause of Asia-Pacific maritime security.135
Future Prospects and Strategic Implications
The 2007 Ningbo Academy study, discussed at length in this analysis, forms an impor-
tant window into the current thinking and evident frustration of those charged with 
contemporary Chinese maritime governance. The authors of that study make a strong 
case that “our current maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with 
our status and image as a great power. . . . Unification of maritime enforcement agencies 
would strengthen our flexibility in maritime conflicts[,] . . . exert pressure on Taiwan 
separatists . . . and would not damage the nation’s strategic opportunity at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century.”136 
Still, the solution of unifying the various maritime enforcement dragons seems to 
remain largely theoretical at this point. The MSA, largest of the maritime enforcement 
agencies by far, could be a logical leader, but others have promoted the SOA because of 
its broader strategic vision. There is little clarity regarding the way forward.137 Even the 
BCD authors of the Ningbo Academy study ask pointedly, “Who will lead?”138
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At least three possible strategic implications can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. 
Most obviously, stronger Chinese coast guard entities will no doubt serve to strengthen 
China’s extensive maritime claims. More and better ships and aircraft at Beijing’s 
disposal will likely increase its confidence in maritime disputes with its neighbors. As 
stated clearly in the Ningbo Academy study, China will continue to “build up its military 
maritime power, developing the power to safeguard its national territorial and maritime 
rights and interests.”139 Yet there is also the practical consideration that “relying on the 
navy . . . makes it easier for certain other countries to use the excuse of ‘the China threat 
theory.’”140 
A second major implication is that stronger Chinese coast guard entities are likely to 
give further impetus to China’s rapidly growing “soft power” both in the Asia-Pacific 
and around the globe. Thus, in June 2008, the Ningbo Academy hosted a maritime law 
enforcement workshop for forty-two senior maritime officials from Asia and Africa.141 
Such activities are likely to grow in size and scope in future decades, ultimately reaching 
a level more in line with China’s major role in international maritime commerce.142 No 
doubt, rescuing sailors from foreign (and often neighboring) nations helps to burnish 
China’s emerging prestige in the arena of maritime safety and security.143
Photo 24. Nanhai Jiu 113 of the Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA will serve off the coast 
of southern China and is one of several new vessels that the MSA has developed in the last 
decade. (China Defense Forum)
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A third strategic implication may be even more important—that coast guards represent 
a distinctively different form of power than do navies. As explained by the authors of the 
Ningbo Academy study, “Naturally, in the course of the struggle for national interests, 
contradictions are inevitable. The real question is what means are used to settle these 
disputes. Giving full play to the government’s capabilities, deploying the navy cautiously 
and strenuously trying to limit the conflict’s scope to among the civil maritime authori-
ties, can avoid a resort to escalation of the crisis.” 
Thus, the Ningbo coauthors articulate a vision of coast guards serving as a kind buffer 
between states in crisis, forestalling the intensification of crises that can result from 
rapid naval deployments. Similarly, a Chinese military analyst wrote in June 2008 that 
coast guard involvement would not complicate crises in the same way that direct navy 
involvement might.144 Geoffrey Till also makes this point in his classic treatise on con-
temporary sea power: “Coastguard ships are often more acceptable politically. . . . [T]he 
involvement of grey-painted warships is often seen as unhelpfully escalatory.”145 To be 
sure, this is an encouraging line of reasoning. The same Chinese analysts also highlight 
Photo 25. Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessel 311 exercises with other FLEC vessels. 
FLEC 311 is China’s largest fisheries management vessel and was dispatched to patrol the South 
China Sea when tensions arose in the area during mid-2009. It is expected that the FLEC will 
receive additional large cutters in the near future. FLEC 311 served formerly with the PLA Navy. 
(China Defense Forum)
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Deng Xiaoping’s prescription to “maintain sovereignty, but shelve rivalry, and pursue 
joint development.” For them, Deng’s formulation represents a new way for China to act 
as a responsible great power that seeks peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.146 Such 
reasoning and stronger and more coherent Chinese coast guard capabilities generally 
make more feasible the realization of China’s emergence as a “responsible maritime 
stakeholder” in the twenty-first century.
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 Abbreviations and Definitions
A  AIS Automatic Identification System
 Amver Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue (system)
B  BCD Border Control Department
C CSI Container Security Initiative
 CMS China Maritime Surveillance 
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
F FLEC Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
G GAC General Administration of Customs
M  MSA  Maritime Safety Administration
P  PLA  People’s Liberation Army
  PRC  People’s Republic of China
R  RCC  Rescue Coordination Center
 ROK  Republic of Korea
S  SOA  State Oceanographic Administration
U  USCG  U.S. Coast Guard
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